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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900254-CA 
v. : 
WAYMON RAY HAMILTON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of 
unlawful sexual intercourse, both third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.^1990), as the appeal is from a district court 
in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was defendant denied his sixth amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel? Review of this issue is based 
on a determination of whether counsel's performance was deficient 
and whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
2. Did defendant preserve for appellate review the 
issue that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief? In order to 
preserve an issue for review, a preservation of that specific 
claim of error must be made part of the trial court record. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 7, 1989, defendant was charged with two 
counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, both third degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (1990) 
(Record [hereafter R.] at 19). At the time of preliminary 
hearing, the State filed an amended information with the same 
charges but alleging different dates (R. at 17 and 20). Glen J. 
Ellis was retained as counsel for defendant (R. at 4). 
Prior to trial, counsel filed a notice of taking of 
deposition (R. at 8), a motion for bill of particulars (R. at 11-
14), and two notices of alibi defense (R. at 21-24 and 29). 
Counsel also filed a motion in limine to restrict use of personal 
correspondence between defendant and the victim. (R. at 57-58). A 
ruling on the motion in limine is not in the record; however, the 
letters which defendant sought to suppress were not offered into 
evidence at trial. The victim did testify as to the letters and 
their content (Transcript of trial [hereafter Tr.] at 54-55). 
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The matter came on for trial by jury on March 19, 1990, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, with the Honorable Boyd L. Park, district judge, 
presiding (R. at 91- 95). The jury found defendant guilty as 
charged (R. at 95 and 89-90). Counsel filed a motion to sentence 
under the next lower category of offense as provided by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) (R. at 98-99) and a motion to arrest 
judgment (R. at 100-101). The court denied the motion to arrest 
judgment and granted the motion to sentence under the next lower 
category (R. at 117-118). On April 27, 1990, the court sentenced 
defendant to two concurrent terms of one year in the Utah County 
jail. The sentence was suspended and defendant placed on 
probation for a period of thirty-six months upon certain 
conditions imposed by the court (R. at 117-19). 
On April 27, 1990, Phil L. Hansen signed a notice of 
appearance as counsel for defendant (R. at 120-21). Defendant 
received a certificate of probable cause and was released from 
custody pending this appeal (R. at 126-27). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Erin Allred was 13 years old when she met defendant in 
1985 at a time when she and a friend provided dinner for 
defendant's family at the birth of defendant's child (Transcript 
[hereafter Tr.] at 19). In the winter of 1987-88, defendant 
coached a church basketball team for young women of fifteen to 
sixteen years of age (Tr. at 20). Erin, who was fifteen years 
old, was not a member of the team because she played on a school 
team; however, she did go to the church ball practices and helped 
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manage the team (Tr. at 18-20). Erin considered defendant a 
friend and would join in the social gatherings defendant 
conducted at his house for the members of the team (Tr. at 22). 
She trusted defendant, viewing him like a big brother (Tr. at 
23). Defendant was 26 years old during this time (Tr. at 18 and 
110 and State's Exh. #2). 
As the basketball season progressed, defendant began 
singling out Erin for attention, telling her that she meant the 
most to him of any girl on the team (Tr, at 25). Defendant began 
hugging, kissing, and holding Erin, once asking her to go into 
the bedroom with him; she declined (Tr. at 25 and 21). After the 
basketball season ended, Erin and one of her friends continued to 
visit defendant's home (Tr. at 33). At one point, defendant told 
Erin that he would wait for her to graduate from high school and 
then he would divorce his wife (Tr. at 35). 
On approximately June 3, 1988, Erin attended the last 
day of the ninth grade and left school at noon (Tr. at 38). 
Defendant had told her the night before to come to his house 
after school and she did so, after stopping at her own home for a 
few minutes (Tr. at 39). When she arrived at defendant's home, 
he was the only one there (Tr. at 40). She sat on the couch and 
leafed through the yearbook that she had received; defendant sat 
down next to her and took the yearbook from her (Tr. at 41). 
Defendant laid Erin on the floor and started to remove her shorts 
and underpants (Tr. at 41-42). Defendant kissed and fondled Erin 
and removed his own shorts (Tr. at 43-44). He inserted his penis 
into her vagina, causing pain, and eventually ejaculated onto her 
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stomach (Tr, at 44-45)* Erin had not had sexual intercourse 
before and when she became "restless," he told her to be patient 
and "wait until he was done," (Tr. at 46 and 62). When defendant 
completed the intercourse, he told her to get cleaned up and 
dressed, which she did, and then she went home (Tr. at 47-48). 
Approximately August 26, 1988, Erin attended Orem High 
School. She remembered the date because it was the first home 
football game of the season. Defendant, who was preparing to 
move to California, telephoned Erin and asked if she had tool to 
take apart his waterbed (Tr. at 48). At approximately 12:30 
p.m., Erin took a screwdriver to defendant's house; she found 
defendant alone in the home, asleep on the living room floor (Tr. 
at 48-50). Defendant had just finished showering and had a towel 
wrapped around him (Tr. at 50). Defendant awoke and Erin laid 
down beside him on the floor (Tr. at 51). Defendant took his 
towel off and removed Erin's clothing (Tr. at 51-52). He then 
had sexual intercourse with her, which included penetration and 
ejaculation (Tr. at 52). 
Defendant denied having intercourse with Erin, claiming 
that he was not at home either of the days that Erin testified 
the intercourse occurred (Tr. at 130-31 and 135). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claims that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance are not supported by specific 
demonstrations of deficient performance; neither has defendant 
alleges or demonstrated how trial counsel's performance 
prejudiced him. Because of defendant's failure to support his 
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claims, this Court should reject defendant's ineffectiveness 
claims. 
Defendant did not preserve for appellate* review the 
specific issue of insufficient evidence. At trial, counsel moved 
to dismiss on the basis that the charged acts of intercourse 
could not have occurred as the victim testified that they did. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the motion to dismiss should 
have been granted because the State had not proven an element of 
the offense, i.e., that the offense occurred in the state of 
Utah. This specific claim was never raised below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL'S ACTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The specifics of defendant's claim that he was afforded 
ineffective assistance of counsel are not entirely clear. 
Defendant's litany of the proceedings found on pages 8 through 15 
of his brief seems to imply that trial counsel's actions, and 
failures to act, were bad; however, specific analysis as to the 
error of these actions or failures to act is lacking. As nearly 
as appellee can tell, defendant is generally claiming that his 
trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he failed to object to 
the introduction of evidence of "unrelated instances" which were 
not necessary to prove the elements of the crimes charged; (2) he 
failed to seek assistance from the court when his attempts to 
depose the victim were rebuffed; (3) he failed to move for a new 
trial; and (4) he failed to persuade the county attorney's office 
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to require that the victim receive a medical examination to 
determine if her claim of virginity prior to intercourse with 
defendant was true. While defendant may be claiming other errors 
by trial counsel, the claims are couched in terms such as "Mr. 
Ellis still did not file any motion that would have been filed by 
any efficient [sic] defense counsel." (Brief of Appellant 
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 15). Such broad conclusory arguments 
make it difficult for the State to respond. The State is left in 
the position of trying to discern the precise nature of the 
errors claimed, fashion defendant's argument, then refute the 
argument. This brief will respond to the four issues noted above 
which are at least specific enough to make out a claim. 
The accepted standard for a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), and has been adopted by the courts of this 
state. In State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant 
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. 
• . • 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. 
723 P.2d at 405 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard as consistent with 
its previous holdings regarding effective assistance of counsel. 
699 P.2d at 1203 (citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 
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(Utah 1983)). According to the court in Lairby, the burden of 
proof lies with the defendant and counsel's ineffectiveness must 
be a demonstrable reality, not a speculative matter. 699 P.2d at 
1203. Trial strategy or tactics do not rise to the level of 
ineffectiveness of counsel simply because they did not produce 
the anticipated result. 699 P.2d at 1203. The deficiency in 
performance must be prejudicial. 699 P.2d at 1203. See 
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109; State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 
(Utah 1976). To be prejudicial, there must be a "reasonable 
probability" that the outcome would be different if counsel's 
performance had not been deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined reasonable probability as "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 494). Mere speculation that an 
outcome may have been different is not sufficient. State v. 
Archuletta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant's first claim is that trial counsel "failed 
to object to many questions which had no foundation, incompetency 
[sic], irrelevancy [sic], and/or inmateriatlity [sic], because 
they were questions which had nothing to do with the incidences 
charged in Count I and Count II of the information. Both being 
about unlawful sexual intercourse [sic]." (Br„ of App. at 9). 
Defendant's brief fails to inform this Court as to what questions 
and "unrelated instances" trial counsel should have objected to. 
Defendant does not quote any of these objectionable materials and 
his record cites are to whole blocks of testimony on direct or 
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cross examination. From this, he asks this Court to ferret out 
the material which trial counsel allegedly should have objected 
to. For example, defendant states 
Mr. Ellis permitted the prosecutor to go 
into all of these other instances about which 
he claims were unrelated [sic] to the 
elements of crimes charged. . . . Yet, Mr. 
Ellis never objected to her testimony about 
these other instances. (Tr. T. 17 to 56,-
direct examination.) 
(Br. of App. at 9-10). The testimony cited by defendant contains 
the entire direct examination of the victim, including the 
testimony of two acts of sexual intercourse which were the basis 
of the two charges. Defendant does not inform this Court what 
the allegedly objectionable material is, either by quoting the 
testimony of these "other instances" or by citing to specific 
transcript pages on which they can be found. Defendant merely 
asks this Court to "read the entire transcript to determine the 
gross errors of Mr. Ellis being an inefficient [sic] defense 
counsel." (Br. of App. at 17). 
The purpose of the Strickland-Frame test "is simply to 
insure that defendant receives a fair trial." Frame, 723 P.2d at 
405. In determining the fairness of a defendant's trial, this 
Court "need not determine whether counsel's performance was 
deficient if defendant fails to satisfy his burden of showing 
that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies." Id. (footnote omitted). If a defendant has made 
no effort to demonstrate any prejudice which he suffered as the 
result of ineffective counsel, his claim must fail. 
It is not enough to claim that the alleged 
ineffectiveness had some conceivable impact 
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on the outcome of the trial. The claim may 
not be speculative, but must demonstrate a 
reality sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable 
professional judgment. 
State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988) (footnote 
omitted). As in Lovell, "defendant has made no effort to 
delineate any prejudice he suffered as the result of 
ineffectiveness of counsel." Id. He has not even attempted to 
"affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability' exists that, 
but for counsel's error, the result would have been different." 
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Because defendant has failed to show 
with specificity how trial counsel's performance was deficient, 
and failed to even allege how the "deficiencies" affected the 
outcome of his trial, this Court should reject defendant's claim. 
Defendant's next apparent ineffectiveness claim 
concerns trial counsel's attempt before trial to depose the 
victim. Again defendant fails to demonstrate how this was 
deficient performance or how he was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
conduct in this area. Evidently, trial counsel filed a motion 
for discovery which was complied with by the county attorney's 
office (Sentencing Transcript [hereafter Sent. Tr.] at 27). 
Trial counsel also filed a notice of taking of deposition and a 
motion for bill of particulars prior to preliminary hearing (R. 
at 7 and 11). The record does not indicate the results of the 
latter notice and motion other than trial counsel's argument at 
the hearing on defendant's motion to arrest judgment (Sent. Tr. 
at 3-7). Defendant apparently now claims that trial counsel's 
actions, or inaction in following up on the notice and motion, 
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constituted deficient performance. Again, the argument is not 
clarified for this Court; defendant merely says, "Effecient [sic] 
defense counsel would not have been so intimidated. He would 
have sought relief from the court by filing proper motions. . . . 
Any efficient [sic] defense counsel would have filed the proper 
motions." (Br. of App. at 13-14 and 15). Defendant does not 
indicate what motions trial counsel should have filed. 
Neither does defendant affirmatively demonstrate how 
these actions, or inactions, by trial counsel prejudiced him. 
Defendant has not alleged that a pretrial conversation with or 
deposition of the victim would have changed the outcome of his 
trial. Defendant's failure to explain what reasonable 
probability exists of a different result had trial counsel acted 
differently is fatal to his ineffectiveness claim. 
Defendant's assertion that trial counsel was 
ineffective because he did not move for a new trial is without 
merit for the same reasons. Defendant merely states that the 
judge "practically, [sic] coaxed" counsel to move for a new trial 
(Br. of App. at 12-13). This allegation does not demonstrate 
deficient performance or a reasonable probability of a different 
trial result absent trial counsel's failure to move for a new 
trial. 
Finally, defendant appears to claim ineffective counsel 
because trial counsel's request that the victim be subjected to a 
medical examination was rejected by the county attorney's office. 
This claim suffers the same deficiencies of being incomplete and 
conclusory as the other claims. Defendant states that such an 
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examination was "absolutely necessary in proving this kind of an 
offense, . . . Mr. Ellis said the alleged victim was a virgin 
and that she never had sex with any other man. . . . Yet, Mr. 
Ellis still did not file any motion that would have been filed by 
any efficient [sic] defense counsel." (Br. of App. at 15; record 
cites omitted). Defendant has failed to specify what motion 
could have been filed and how the failure to file that motion 
affected the trial verdict. 
All of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel are given in conclusory terms which fail to meet the 
Strickland-Frame test. Defendant has neither shown that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient or that there was a 
reasonable probability of a different result had counsel acted in 
a different fashion. Consequently, this Court should reject 
defendant's ineffectiveness claim. 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE {STATE'S 
CASE-IN-CHIEF. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it 
denied his motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-
chief. Such a motion is governed by rule 17(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (1990), which reads: 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the 
prosecution, . . . the court may issue an 
order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the 
ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged 
therein or any lesser included offense. 
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While defendant did move to dismiss at the conclusion of the 
State's case-in-chief, he did not preserve the specific ground 
which he now cites for that motion. 
MA general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal." Importantly, the grounds 
for the objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated. Here, although 
defendant made a general motion to the trial 
court to dismiss the "personal gain" 
circumstance charged, the grounds he now 
raises on appeal were not specifically or 
distinctly stated to the court below. Thus, 
under the standard noted, they were not 
preserved for our review. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). The only insufficiency in the evidence which defendant 
raises on appeal was an alleged failure by the State to prove 
that the offense occurred in the state of Utah. This specific 
ground was never raised in the trial court and has not been 
preserved for appellate review. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this JZEj^day of February, 
1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
c_ 
NE BARLOW 
len-} 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Phil L. Hansen, Attorney for defendant, 1205 East South Temple, 
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